The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of a particular condition concerning the possession (...) of evidence. The core position adopted here then is that false propositions that are approximately true reports of measurements can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. So, it will be argued that evidence is only quasi-factive in this very specific sense. (shrink)

How does our understanding of the reality (or lack thereof ) of race as a category of being affect our understanding of racism as a social phenomenon, and vice versa? How should we envision the aims and methods of our struggles against racism? Traditionally, the Western political and philosophical tradition held that true social justice points toward a raceless future--that racial categories are themselves inherently racist, and a sincere advocacy for social justice requires a commitment to the elimination or abolition (...) of race altogether. This book focuses on the underlying assumptions that inform this view of race and racism, arguing that it is ultimately bound up in a "politics of purity"--an understanding of human agency, and reality itself, as requiring all-or-nothing categories with clear and unambiguous boundaries. Racism, being organized around a conception of whiteness as the purest manifestation of the human, thus demands a constant policing of the boundaries among racial categories. Drawing upon a close engagement with historical treatments of the development of racial categories and identities, the book argues that races should be understood not as clear and distinct categories of being but rather as ambiguous and indeterminate (yet importantly real) processes of social negotiation. As one of its central examples, it lays out the case of the Irish in seventeenth-century Barbados, who occasionally united with black slaves to fight white supremacy--and did so as white people, not as nonwhites who later became white when they capitulated to white supremacy. Against the politics of purity, Monahan calls for the emergence of a "creolizing subjectivity" that would place such ambiguity at the center of our understanding of race. The Creolizing Subject takes seriously the way in which racial categories, in all of their variety and ambiguity, situate and condition our identity, while emphasizing our capacity, as agents, to engage in the ongoing contestation and negotiation of the meaning and significance of those very categories. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: * Notes * References.

This book is about an important issue which has arisen within two of the branches of physical science - namely thermodynamics and statistical mechanics - where the notion of entropy plays an essential role. A number of scientists and information theorists have maintained that entropy is a subjective concept and is a measure of human ignorance. Such a view, if it is valid, would create some profound philosophical problems and would tend to undermine the objectivity of the scientific enterprise. Whilst (...) the present volume is not a treatise on thermodynamics or statistical mechanics, all relevant steps in the building up of these disciplines are carefully scrutinised and it is concluded that the charge of subjectivity cannot be upheld. The widely adopted view that entropy is a measure of disorder, or of lack of information, is shown to be ambiguous, although it may be of use in certain contexts. (shrink)

Where does the particular form or configuration of a pattern come from, and how is it propagated from pattern to pattern? Templets and the Explanation of Complex Patterns provides a natural language for analysing such questions. Using it, the organisational forces that underlie the fabrication of any pattern can be divided into two classes. First, there are the 'universal laws' of pattern assembly, the configurational rules and constraints inherent within the fabric of the pattern elements themselves. Second, there are the (...) 'templets' - external, situational constraints imposed on the pattern elements. From the perspective of templeting, simple patterns can be directly contrasted with complex patterns: the former are completely determined by their universal laws, whereas the latter also require extensive templets. Natural patterns range along the entire spectrum from simple to complex, and the most complex of these include both random patterns and many biological patterns. (shrink)

This paper shows that any view of future contingent claims that treats such claims as having indeterminate truth values or as simply being false implies probabilistic irrationality. This is because such views of the future imply violations of reflection, special reflection and conditionalization.

In a number of countries, issues to do with religion seem increasingly to be of importance in school science lessons and some other science educational settings, such as museums. This chapter begins by discussing the nature of religion and the nature of science and then looks at understandings of possible relationships between science and Christianity with particular reference to such issues as determinism, evolution and the uses to which advances in scientific knowledge may be put. It then goes on to (...) examine whether the notion of worldviews is helpful to science educators working in this area. Finally, ways of teaching science so as to take account of Christian beliefs are considered. (shrink)

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be (...) the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility. (shrink)

How one structures an organization is not only important from the perspective of productivity and efficiency, but primarily how it affects the moral formation of those who are employed in that organization. Organizational structures whether in the manufacturing, service or non-profit sector have moral dimensions that cannot be escaped. Papal social tradition has been concerned about the moral formation of all workers within the organization. This tradition has maintained that an essential component to a humane organizational structure is participation of (...) those involved in the organization, and consequently that participation must be understood primarily in terms of the formation of employees. This article explores the papal social tradition''s understanding of participation and examines its significance in today''s organizational environment, particularly in reference to work-teams. (shrink)

We do things in time. Philosophy of action can capture this phenomenon in at least two ways. On one hand, it might focus on the way that temporal preferences and long-term temporal horizons affect the rationality of decisions in the present (see, e.g., Parfit 1984; Rawls 1971). Such work may focus on the way we discount the distant future, for example, or prioritize the future over the past. Approaches of this kind treat time as, in a sense, something external to (...) agency; it sets various constraints on what we may rationally intend, for example. But if temporal considerations can constrain agency, it follows that they can also structure it internally, and if they can do so, it seems likely that this is possible because agency is already temporally structured. This volume focuses on the way that agency is temporally structured from within, such that time is an ineliminable constituent of agency. (shrink)

_Asking Good Questions_ moves beyond a traditional discussion of ethical theory, focusing on how educators can use these important frameworks to facilitate critical thinking about real-life ethical dilemmas. In this way, authors Nancy Stanlick and Michael Strawser offer students a theoretical tool kit for creatively addressing issues that influence their own environments. This text begins with a discussion of key ethical theorists and then guides the reader through a series of original case studies and follow-up activities that facilitate critical (...) thinking, emphasize asking thought provoking questions, and teach the student to address the complexity of ethical dilemmas while incorporating the viewpoints of their peers. Additionally, Stanlick and Strawser include an extensive preface, a mind-mapping technique for analyzing and formulating arguments, and a six step process for approaching complex real-life moral issues. Each chapter incorporates suggested assignments, discussion questions, and references for further reading, and a guide for instructors offering a sample course schedule and suggestions on how to use this book effectively is also available. This text is designed to help educators engage students in a meaningful discussion of how historical theories apply to their own lives, providing rich and unique resources to learn about these critical issues. (shrink)

For nearly two centuries, developmental biologists have known that body organs are derived from distinct germ layers. They have argued that adult stem cells formed in one of these, mesoderm for example, cannot give rise to cells that originate in another. We disagree. An exception to this “rule” has been described in crayfish recently. In this species, hemocytes appear to replenish neurogenic cells. This may happen in humans as well. In women who were given male bone marrow‐derived cells, Y chromosome (...) positive cheek cells and brain neurons were detected. While repopulation of these tissues by bone marrow derived cells may not occur normally, and while it does not appear to be terribly efficient, the phenomenon should be studied in more detail. Perhaps cells in the marrow could be used to regenerate tissues elsewhere. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the role of Anselm’s ontological argument in the philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. Anselm’s argument appears prominently in Collingwood’s Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) and Essay on Metaphysics (1940), as well as in his early work Speculum Mentis (1924). In the proof, Collingwood finds the central expression of the priority of “faith” in the first principles of thought to reason’s activities. For Collingwood, it is Anselm’s proof that clearly expresses this relationship between faith and reason. The (...) two elements of this analysis that must be understood if one is to understand Collingwood’s use of the proof are what he means by “the idea of an object that shall completely satisfy the demands of reason” and the “special case of metaphysical thinking.” I analyze both of these elements and conclude by showing how Anselm’s proof is essential to Collingwood’s historical science of mind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:141 HUME AND CAUSAL INFERENCE Hume held that any time we reach by inference a belief about the existence or qualities of some object or event that we have not actually perceived, the inference is grounded in beliefs about causal relations holding between the object of belief and some other object or objects that have actually been experienced. I will examine here Hume's account of such causal inferences. There (...) are many places in the Treatise of Human Nature at which Hume seems to claim that causal inferences take place when and only when the percipient has had an extensive previous experience of objects of the respective types as regularly conjoined in relations of contiguity and temporal priority. It seems to me that reliance on these passages alone gives a distorted view of Hume's theory of causal inference. Contrary to appearances, Hume did not hold that extensive previous experiences of objects of the same types as properly conjoined is either necessary or sufficient for causal inference. Hume's view is more subtle and complicated, and there are important considerations of coherence and holism present in it. Getting Hume's view on this matter clear is important because it shows how he can escape some of the objections that have been laid against his theory, and it makes possible a reading of Hume as a causal realist. Hume's theory of inference provides the resources for drawing a distinction between accidental and genuine causal regularities and it is compatible with the view that causal relations (and not mere de facto regularities) hold among events in the world independently of their being perceived. The examination begins by looking at a different, but related, issue. Why does Hume think 142 that of the three types of association, only cause and effect association is capable of producing belief? Hume puts the question in the form of a possible objection to his account. For it may be said, that if all the parts of that hypothesis be true, viz. that these three species of relation are deriv'd from the same principles; that their effects in inforcing and inlivening our ideas are the same; and that belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea; it shou'd follow, that that action of the mind may not only be deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, but also from those of contiguity and resemblance. But as we find by experience, that belief arises only from causation, and that we can draw no inference from one object to another, except they be connected by this relation, we may conclude, that there is some error in that reasoning, which leads us into such difficulties. (T 107) It is important to note that Hume is talking here only about beliefs about the existence or situations of objects that have not been intuited or experienced. Beliefs about relations of ideas (e.g., that 2 + 2 = 4) are intuitions (or perhaps memories 2 of intuitions). Beliefs in the existence of things as experienced or in the previous existence of things as previously experienced automatically have the 3 vivacity of impressions or memory ideas. What Hume takes himself to need to explain is why cause and effect association allows for a transfer of this vivacity to an idea of an object or situation that has not itself been intuited or experienced and why 4 resemblance and contiguity association do not. If I see a green ball next to a red sweater, then I will normally subsequently believe that the green ball existed next to the red sweater at that time (at 143 least until my memories begin to lose vivacity). This is purely a matter of sense experience and memory. Now if I subsequently see a different red sweater (or the same sweater in a different location), I may be led to think of a green ball existing next to it purely through contiguity and resemblance association. But presumably I would not believe that a green ball existed next to the currently perceived red sweater unless I currently perceived a green ball or my belief was based on some 5 form of causal inference... (shrink)

This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, from which he inferred what is here called the (...) First Answer to the question. In Foundations of Ethics Ross repudiated the Objective View in favor of the Subjective View, from which he inferred a Second Answer. In this paper each of the Objective and Subjective Views and the First and Second Answers are rejected in favor of the Prospective View and a Third Answer. The implications of the Prospective View for another question closely related to the original question are then investigated: what precisely is your right regarding my returning the book and what constitutes its satisfaction? (shrink)

The European Biomedical Ethics Practitioner Education Project (EBEPE), funded by the BIOMED programme of the European Commission, is a five-nation partnership to produce open learning materials for healthcare ethics education. Papers and case studies from a series of twelve conferences throughout the European Union, reflecting the ‘burning issues’ in the participants' healthcare systems, have been collected by a team based at Imperial College, London, where they are now being edited into a series of seven activity-based workbooks for individual or group (...) study. These draft workbooks are now being read by a network of critical readers across Europe, whose comments will be incorporated into the final versions of the workbooks. The result will be the first European-wide and Europe-centred resource for teaching students, practitioners, and members of ethics committees. Topics covered include: • Resource allocation and rationing • The rights of children and young people • Long-term care of the elderly • Mental health and mental illness • Autonomy and patient choice • Decisions at the end of life • A study guide to using the workbooks The collaborative nature of the project has highlighted differentiated national approaches in medical ethics. Against the British and Dutch rights-orientated approach have emerged two other alternative models: the Nordic preference for administrative resolution of entitlement disputes, and the southern European emphasis on deontological codes. A genuinely European reconstruction of autonomy and rights, using hermeneutic, feminist and narrative approaches to counterbalance individualistic models, is emerging across the workbooks. The programme has also uncovered national differences in how ethics should be taught, with the workbooks' style being an experiential approach. Thus the EBEPE project is developing new models in both substantive and pedagogic senses, about both what should be taught and how it should be presented. (shrink)

Jeffery et al. suggest that three-dimensional environments are not represented according to their volumetric properties, but in a quasi-planar fashion. Here we take into consideration the role of visual experience and the use of technology for spatial learning to better understand the nature of the preference of horizontal over vertical spatial representation.

Preston and Hofelich (2012) suggested that researchers disagree on the role of self–other overlap in empathy due to a failure to differentiate among neural overlap, subjective resonance, and personal distress; they also developed a framework for tying neural and subjective overlap to various aspects of functioning they include in the construct of empathy. Although we found their discussion of different processes that have been labeled empathy interesting and helpful, we found their discussion of self–other overlap to be somewhat less useful (...) for conceptualizing differences among empathy-related processes. In addition, we provide an alternative perspective to their reasoning regarding the role of experience and neural overlap in an aspect of empathy-related responding (e.g., concern or compassion). (shrink)

When phylogenetic trees constructed from morphological and molecular evidence disagree (i.e. are incongruent) it has been suggested that the differences are spurious or that the molecular results should be preferred a priori. Comparing trees can increase confidence (congruence), or demonstrate that at least one tree is incorrect (incongruence). Statistical analyses of 181 molecular and 49 morphological trees shows that incongruence is greater between than within the morphological and molecular partitions, and this difference is significant for the molecular partition. Because the (...) level of incongruence between a pair of trees gives a minimum bound on how much error is present in the two trees, our results indicate that the level of error may be underestimated by congruence within partitions. Thus comparisons between morphological and molecular trees are particularly useful for detecting this incongruence (spurious or otherwise). Molecular trees have higher average congruence than morphological trees, but the difference is not significant, and both within- and between-partition incongruence is much lower than expected by chance alone. Our results suggest that both molecular and morphological trees are, in general, useful approximations of a common underlying phylogeny and thus, when molecules and morphology clash, molecular phylogenies should not be considered more reliable a priori. (shrink)

T.M. Scanlon (1998) proposes that promise breaking is wrong because it shows manipulative disregard for the expectations for future behavior created by promising. I argue that this account of promissory obligation is mistaken in it own right, as well as being at odds with Scanlon's contractualism. I begin by placing Scanlon's account of promising within a tradition that treats the creation of expectations in promise recipients as central to promissory obligation. However, a counterexample to Scanlon's account, his case of the (...) "Profligate Pal," will show that this view of promissory obligation, which I call the Expectations View, is incorrect. In its place, I propose an account of promissory obligation I call Promising as Accountability, according to which promising is a way of making oneself accountable to others for a future act. Not only is Promising as Accountability a more defensible approach to promissory obligation, it also better fits with certain general features of Scanlon's contractualism. (shrink)